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FOREWORD 
The volume now presented to the public · is an 
attempt to chronicle briefly and accurately the 
course of military operations in Manchuria subse-
quently to what happened immediately after the 
outbreak of September 18, 1931, (vide the Herald 
of Asia Library of Contemporary History. No. 4), 
to which is added a short reference to the minor 
trouble at Tientsin. The narrative is brought 
down to the first week of February, 1932, it being 
based on official data given out so far. 
In some remote corners of Manchuria small 
parties of troops led by the adherents of the 
dispossessed warlords are still at large and give 
some trouble. But it is generally believed that the 
entry of the Japanese army into Harbin marks the 
termination of the military stage in the history of 
Manchurian rebirth. 
The epoch just ushered in is marked by the 
birth of a new and independent state. This seems 
the logical outcome of the peculiar situation 
resulting from China's miserable failure to function 
as an efficient and responsible political entity. To 
let Chang Hsueh-liang return to Mukden would be 
to repeat the same disastrous experience. And 
there is no leader who could be trusted to avoid 
Chang's mistakes. The emergence of the independ-
ent Republic of Manchuria, therefore, comes very 
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opportune. It may or may not prove a success, 
but it is at least an experiment worth trying. 
In the meantime, it may be worthwhile to make 
it clear that Japan, in so far as it lies in her 
power, will not countenance any policy on the 
part of the new Republic of Manchuria contrary 
to her traditional policy of the open door and equal 
opportunity, and there is every reason to believe 
that the Chinese and Manchurian leaders in the 
new Government of Manchuria will remain true to 
that policy. Time, however, is not yet ripe for 
further reference to the new Manchurian state. It 
is only just born, and it will be some time yet 
before it will actually begin to function. 
What is most satisfactory in connection with the 
present situation, is the splendid unanimity of 
purpose with which the whole nation has responded 
to the call for service and sacrifice in the interest 
of the country. Indeed, our people of all classes 
have never been more thoroughly united than they 
are now. This is the result in part of the tradi· 
tiona! spirit of loyalty and patriotism, but it is also 
the result of a strong and widespread recognition 
by our people of the enormous importance of the 
stake Japan has in Manchuria. Practically every 
body in Japan realizes how closely and vitally our 
welfare and strength is bound up with the assurance 
of stable peace in Manchuria. 
How strongly the nation has rallied round the 
Army in connection with the Manchurian affair, 
may be guaged by the amount of voluntary 
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contributions sent in to the War Office for consol· 
ing the men at the front. It had amounted by 
February 10, 1932, to ¥2,100,000, while the consolation 
bags received by the same date had totalled 1,300,000. 
At the time of our war with Russia, the respective 
figures were ¥1,260,000 and 590,000. These contri-
butions came from all parts 9f the country and all 
sorts of people. The same spirit has also found 
expression in prayers offered at shrines and temples 
for the prosperity of the Imperial House. The 
same observation applies also to the public enthu· 
siasm in sending Qff troops to the front or in 
paying respects to the ashes of the officers and 
men killed in action, when they are sent home. 
The enthusiasm now shown in these respects 
compare favourably with what was noticed during 
the Russian war. 
MoTOSADA ZUMOTO 
Tokyo, March, 1932. 
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I. BATTLE OF THE NONNI 
1. Up to Outbreak of Hostilities 
The first important conflict between the Japanese 
and Chinese forces in Manchuria after the fightings 
immediately following the now historic outbreak on 
the night of September 18, 1931, took place on the 
Nonni in North Manchuria at the beginning of 
November. It was occasioned by an act of treachery 
on the part of a detachment of the Heilungkiang 
army stationed on the northern side of the river, 
which, contrary to previous understanding, suddenly 
opened fire upon a small party of Japanese troops 
that had been sent there for the protection of the 
repairs then proceeding on the bridges. 
It may be recalled that shortly after the Mukden 
incident there began a trouble between the Heilung· 
kiang army under General Ma Chan-shan and the 
army at Taonan under General Chang Hai·peng. 
Consequently much apprehension was generally 
entertained as to the safety of the Taonan·Angangchi 
railway. General Chang was then making prepara· 
tions for proceeding to Tsitsihar by that railway at 
the head of his army, with a view to seizing the 
provincial government of Heilungkiang. On the 
other hand General Ma, by order of General Wan 
Pu-lin, concentrated his troops at Tsitsihar to 
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frustrate General Chang's northward expedition. 
There is reason to believe that the Heilungkiang 
army was in secret communication with the Soviet 
army over the border, trying to secure assistance 
in the form of arms and ammunition. 
By the middle of October, General Chang's army 
had commenced its northward march by the Taonan· 
Angangchi railway. With its main body stationed 
at Wumiaotze (north of Tailai), a part of the army 
advanced to the neighbourhood of the Nonni, when 
its further progress was stopped by the advance 
guard of the Heilungkiang army stationed on the 
opposite bank of the river with some field pieces. 
Moreover, the railway bridges had been damaged by 
General Ma's army on the 15th or 16th of October. 
Under the circumstances General Chang had for 
the moment to give up any hope of immediate march 
upon Tsitsihar, and so he retreated with the main 
body of his army to the neighbourhood of Taoan. 
To make the story clear, it must be noted that 
the Taonan-Angangchi railway was built by the 
South Manchuria Railway under contract with the 
Mukden Government. Starting work in March, 
1925, it was turned over to that Government in 
December, 1926, it being opened to public traffic in 
March, 1927. The amount of money advanced by 
the South Manchuria Railway Company was 
¥17,000,000, of which ¥13,000,000 was the cost of 
construction and ¥4,000,000 the price of the rolling 
stock and other forms of equipment. As for the 
repayment of this money, it was arranged 
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(1) That the money required for the construction 
of the railway and its equipment should be paid by 
the Mukden Government immediately upon the 
delivery of the railway, and 
(2) That in case such payment is not effected 
within six months after the delivery of the railway, 
a special agreement shall be made in the form of 
a loan contract at 9 percent annual interest. 
But the Mukden Government failed to carry out 
any of these terms, even refusing to implement its 
obligation as originally agreed upon. Its indebtedness 
to the South Manchuria Railway Company on this 
score amounted by the end of June, 1931, to 
¥26,000,000, principal and interest together. Under 
the circumstances, this railway may justly be 
regarded as property of the South Manchuria 
Railway Company, forming one of its feeder lines. 
In any case it forms a sufficiently valuable Japanese 
interest to be protected against damage by any 
body, Chinese or otherwise. Moreover, the present 
stoppage of traffic over this railway happened to be 
at a season when the farm products of North 
Manchuria were being shipped southward, thus 
causing no small loss to the railways concerned 
and also to the farmers in the wide range of 
territory tapped by those lines. 
The Taonan-Angangchi railway authorities and 
the South Manchuria Railway Company, consequent-
ly, made combined efforts, through our diplomati~ 
and military channels, to get the damage to the 
railway bridges over the Nonni repaired by some 
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responsible Chinese authorities. These efforts, 
however, failed to bear any fruit, so it only 
remained for us to undertake ourselves the neces-
sary repairs under the protection of our troops. 
It may be interesting to recapitulate some of the 
facts connected with the fruitless attempts made to 
get the repairs made by some Chinese authorities : 
(1) On October 12, a Japanese member of the 
staff of the Taonan-Angangchi railway, together 
with three Chinese colleagues, went to the Nanni 
bridges to make an inspection of the damage, but 
they were not permitted to carry out their mission, 
as a detachment of some 80 Heilungkiang troops 
brushed aside their identification papers and forced 
them to turn back at the point of their machine 
guns. Their train was actually fired upon with 
field pieces. 
(2) On October 21, a Japanese plane reconnoitred 
along the Taonan-Angangchi railway as far as the 
Nanni bridges, where it was fired upon by the 
Heilungkiang troops stationed on the north side of 
the river. The matter was at once taken up by 
our military authorities with the Heilungkiang 
Government through Consul Shimizu at Tsitsihar. 
(3) On October 23, Consul Shimizu opened negotia· 
tions with the local Chinese authorities concerning 
the repa:irs to the damaged railway bridges. The 
Chinese authorities replied that, as they would 
undertake the necessary repairs, the Japanese should 
never interfere with the railway. They, however, 
refused to say when the repairs would be made. 
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They further declared that, in case the Japanese 
attempted to undertake repairs, the Heilungkiang 
army wouid prevent it by force. 
(4) After repeated negotiations, General MaChan-
shan finally set October 30 as the date for starting 
repair work. But as a matter of fact, he tried not 
only to postpone the work but to intimidate us by 
saying that behind him there was a Soviet army of 
50,000 men. 
Being now thoroughly assured that the Chinese 
authorities had no intention of undertaking the 
required repair work on the bridges over the Nonni, 
the Directors of the Taonan-Angangchi railway 
and the South Manchuria Railway Company decided 
to start the repair work themselves on November 
4, and applied to the headquarters of the Kwantung 
Army for adequate military protection. This deci-
sion on their part was necessary in view of the 
fact that the river was due to be frozen very soon, 
in which case proper repairs would be impossible. 
As for the military protection, its necessity was 
obvious from the proved temper and past conduct 
of the Heilungkiang army and the bandits who 
infested the neighbourhood. 
The Kwantung Army, thereupon, decided to 
accept the application for protection, and issued 
orders for the despatch of a . detachment to the 
Nonni on November 2. At the same time an ' 
identical communication was sent to both the 
Heilungkiang army and General Chang Hai-peng's 
army, calling their attention to the following points : 
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(1) That the Japanese army observes strict 
neutrality as to the civil strife between the two 
Chinese armies. 
(2) That, in order to prevent unforeseen complica-
tions, both the Chinese armies should retire to a 
distance of 10 kilometres from the nearest bridge. 
(3) That for the time being the bridges may not 
be used by either army for military purposes. 
(4) In case of any interference with the actions 
of the Japanese army or any hostile action against 
it, necessary and efficient measures of self-protection 
will be taken against the offending army, whichever 
it may be. 
It should be stated that the Nonni at this point 
has a wide river-bed, measuring about 8 kilometres 
from one side to the other. It is spanned by five 
separate bridges, of which the three nearest the 
southern (i.e. the right) bank were damaged. The 
railway station at the southern bank is called 
Kiangchiao, and that on the north bank Tahsing. 
In order to afford efficient protection to the repair 
party, it was evident that our detachment should 
occupy Tahsing on the .north side. But a body of 
Heilungkiang troops was in occupation of that 
neighbourhood. So the Japanese army requested it 
to move 10 kilometres further north. 
The Japanese detachment detailed for the protec· 
tion of the repair party consisted of a battalion of 
infantry (three companies), with a battalion of 
artillery (two companies) and a company of en· 
gineers, under the command of Colonel Hamamoto. 
7 
It was called the Nonni Detachment, and its 
transportation was commenced on November 2. 
The troops under General Chang, in compliance 
with our request, retreated to the south of 
Wumiaotze. But the Heilungkiang forces, so far 
from retreating from their positions, were busily 
engaged in warlike preparations, showing a pro-
vokingly hostile attitude toward our detachment. 
For instance, when a scouting party proceeded on 
November 2 as far as the ·second bridge to inspect 
the actual state of the damage done, it was heavily 
fired upon by the Heilungkiang troops. Again on 
the morning of November 3 our scouting party 
despatched on a similar errand found the third 
bridge in occupation of Heilungkiang troops with 
three machine guns which at once opened fire upon 
it, so that it had to retreat without accomplishing 
its object. 
The disposition of the Heilungkiang army in the 
neighbourhood of Angangchi on the night of 
November 4, is shown on Chart 1. 
2. Progress of Hostilities 
1. November 4. 
In compliance with an earnest request of the 
Heilungkiang army, a party of Japanese authorities, ,. 
including Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi, came 
down to the Nonni from Tsitsihar, arriving at 
Kiangchao at 8.30 a.m. They were accompanied 
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by General Shih, Chief of Staff to the Heilungkiang 
army, and a few other Chinese officials. From 
there General Shih notified the commander of 
the Japanese Nanni detachment to the effect that 
the Heilungkiang army had no hostile intention 
toward the Japanese forces. He left there almost 
immediately afterward. Thereupon, the Japanese 
detachment sent a small party (a company) to 
Tahsing with two national flags, one large and the 
other small. When it reached a point about 1,000 
metres south of Tahsing at about 1.30 in the 
afternoon, it was suddenly and unexpectedly sub-
jected to a heavy fire from the Heilungkiang troops 
stationed on the north side of the Nanni, sustaining 
15 casualties. It had to fall back to the bridge-head, 
where it joined the engineer company and waited 
for the arrival of the main body of the detachment. 
It was shortly after two that the detachment 
joined the advance party at the bridge-head, where 
it found in front a wide strech of marshy land 
very difficult of negotiation. To add to its worry, 
our artillery fire did not reach the enemy's position. 
A frontal attack being under the circumstances out 
of the question, the advance party was ordered to 
outflank the enemy on his left side. It was thus 
decided to wait for developments. 
In the meantime our airplanes bombed the 
enemy's position, doing considerable amount of 
damage. But the enemy still continued to bombard 
our position. By 4.30, however, one of our mountain 
pieces was with great difficulty brought up to the 
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back of our first line. It at once went into action 
and succeeded in silencing the enemy's artillery. 
All this while, the advance party under a heavy 
fire from the enemy struggled through the marshy 
land and succeeded in occupying an elevated 
position about 3 kilometres north-east of Tahsing. 
But the battle had not shown noticeable development 
when night descended upon the scene. 
The Commander of the Kwantung Army, acting 
upon the report submitted by a staff officer who 
bad been sent to observe the operations, issued an 
order tonight for the despatch of another battalion 
of infantry to reinforce the Nonni detachment. 
2. November 5. 
The main body of our detachment commenced 
operations at four in the morning, opened artillery 
fire at six and started a forward offensive movement 
shortly after seven. The Chinese occupying a 
strong position offered a stout resistance, and 
owing also to the topographical disadvantage, the 
progress of the engagement was slow. Our troops, 
however, succeeded in wresting from the enemy 
an important point about one and a half kilometres 
east of Tahsing Station at about half past eight. 
At ten our detachment occupied the enemy's first 
line of defence. The enemy retreated seven or 
eight hundred metres back to his second line of 
defence where he continued to offer a strong 
resistance. Our artillery experienced great difficulty 
; 
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in moving the guns, so that only three field and 
three mountain pieces were brought into action by 
ten o'clock. The result was that it degenerated 
into a drawn engagement. Not only that, at about 
three in the afternoon a superior force of the enemy 
assumed an offensive against the right back of our 
detachment, inflicting a heavy damage upon it. In 
consequence, our detachment was forced to reform 
part of its fighting line, and darkness fell upon it 
still engaged in a difficult fight. 
In the morning the staff officer despatched from 
the headquarters had reported to the Commander 
that the Heilungkiang army did not seem inclined 
to retire, but that . it seemed intent upon making a 
determined resistance. So the Commander ordered 
two more infantry battalions and three artillery 
companies to hasten to the support of the detach-
ment. At 7.30 the first reinforcement, Nagura 
battalion, arrived and at once took up position. 
But it hardly sufficed to tum the scale decisively 
in our favour, so that the detachment passed a 
most anxious night impatiently waiting for the 
arrival of the rest of the reinforcements. 
3. November 6. 
Today the command of the detachment was taken 
over by Major-General Hasebe who had come with 
the reinforcements. With the arrival of successive 
units of the reinforcements, the fight assumed a 
favourable turn. The enemy's units in the rear 
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began to retire northward from about eight in the 
morning, while a party of cavalry which had been 
harassing us from early morning withdrew in a 
northerly and north-easterly direction. The enemy's 
first line still continued to put up a stout fight, 
and it was only when an important position was 
captured by Nagura battalion under artillery support 
that the enemy began to falter, so that our detach-
ment succeeded in occupying the enemy's position 
a little after ten o'clock. 
At noon our detachment concentrated its strength 
to the east of Tahsing and took up a suitable 
position for the protection of the party engaged in 
repairing the bridges. 
The enemy's infantry which fought in the vicinity 
of Tahsing was not less than 2,000 strong. In 
addition, a large body of cavalry also took part in 
the fight. The main body of the retreating enemy 
halted in the neighbourhood of Angangchi, while a 
small portion continued the retreat to Tsitsihar. 
4. Casualties. 
I. On our side : 
Killed-1 officer; 35 n.c.o. and men 
Wounded-7 officers; 15 n.c.o. and 122 men 
Total casualties-180 
Aeroplanes damaged-3 
II. The enemy left 200 dead, of whom two were 
Russians. 
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II. BATTLE OF ANGANGCHI 
1. Ma's Diplomatic Manoeuvring 
When the Heilungkiang army was defeated at the 
Nonni on November 6, our detachment which had 
been joined by the second reinforcements and which 
was about to be joined by a third party of reinforce-
ments, could have easily launched a strong attack 
upon the retreating enemy, thereby inflicting such a 
damage upon him as would probably have fatally 
crippled him. And our men in the first line were 
eager to take such a course. But their commander 
wisely refrained from it for fear lest it might lead 
to an undesirable complication of the situation 
contrary to the principle of peace underlying the 
national policy of Japan. 
But unfortunately the praiseworthy forbearance 
shown by our commander was interpreted by 
General Ma Chan-shan as a sign of weakness. He 
accordingly halted his retreating army at a point 
south of Angangchi only a few kilometres from the 
Nonni, and constructed a strong position there. 
Moreover, he summoned there reinforcements from 
Heiho, Harbin and Manchuli. At the same time he 
received telegraphic instructions from Chang Hsueh-
liang at Peiping, ordering him to utilize convenient 
opportunity for exterminating the Japanese army. 
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He was also idolized by his fellow countrymen as 
a national hero. The result was that General Ma's 
men were highly elated and longed for further 
opportunity for distinguishing themselves. They 
intrigued to create disturbances in the rear of our 
detachment and also to injure again the bridges over 
the Nonni. It was thus increasingly evident that 
another collision between the Japanese and Chinese 
forces was inevitable in that part of Manchuria. 
But the Kwantung army headquarters did not 
give up the hope of arriving at an amicable under-
standing with General Ma. So it caused its repre-
sentative at Tsitsihar, Major Hayashi, to take the 
matter up with General Ma at that town. Several 
interviews took place between them on November 
3 and thereafter, when the treacherous conduct on 
the part of Ma at the Nonni and Tahsing was 
pointed out to him, and he was urged to call his 
troops back to Tsitsihar, at the same time guaran-
tying the safety of the Taonan-Angangchi railway. 
But General Ma did not respond to these overtures 
in a favourable manner or in a spirit of sincerity. 
On the contrary he seemed to be only anxious to 
push forward his hostile preparations. 
Under these circumstances it was clear that, 
unless something was done to ease the situation, a 
dangerous clash would become unavoidable between 
the Japanese and Chinese armies. So the Kwan- ' 
tung army headquarters, with a view to placing the 
Heilungkiang army and our Nonni detachment a~ a 
safe distance from each other, made the following 
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fair and moderate proposal to the Chinese side on 
November 14: 
(1) Ma Chan-shan should withdraw to Tsitsihar 
and north of it, at the same time causing the troops 
concentrated at Tsitsihar and the neighbourhood of 
Angangchi in connection with the present complica-
tion to return to their original positions. 
(2) Ma Chan-shan should not send his troops 
south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
(3) The Taonan-Angangchi railway will be 
operated by the administrative bureau of that line, 
and Ma Chan-shan should in no way interfere with 
its operation. In case of such interference, the 
Imperial army will at once take necessary and 
efficient measures. 
(4) Ma Chan-shan should carry out the conditions 
mehtioned above within ten days from November 
15. 
(5) The Nonni detachment of the Japanese army, 
after satisfying itself as to the carrying out of the 
aforementioned conditions, will at once retire to the 
south of Taoan or Chengchiatun. 
Ma Chan-shan was told that his reply to the 
above communication was expected by noon on 
November 16. But nothing was heard from him 
within the required time limit. Not only that, his 
troops surrounded the Japanese Consulate at 
Tsitsihar on the pretext of guarding it, and set up 
military works in the neighbourhood with ordnances 
trained at the front gate. The Consulate was 
entirely isolated, all communication with the outside 
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being prevented. Even Chinese servants were not 
allowed freely to go out and get provisions. So 
Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi were obliged to 
leave Tsitsihar for Harbin on the morning of 
November 14. 
On November 16, at about 10 p.m., a telephone 
message was received from Ma Chan-shan through 
Chang Ching-hui, Director of the Harbin Special 
District, to the effect that he was ready to accept the 
whole of the conditions proposed by Japan, but that 
he would formally reply by letter. This was ten 
hours after the time limit set by our proposal, and 
instead of being delivered, as it should have been, 
through a responsible representative of the Heilung-
kiang Provincial Government, it came through an 
irresponsible third party. These and other circum-
stances apparently roused suspicions as to the 
sincerity of General Ma. It looked as if he was 
watching the possible change of atmosphere at the 
Council of the League of Nations, and that his idea 
in forwarding this belated message through an 
irregular medium was simply to provide a diplomatic 
excuse in view of future negotiations, a customary 
Chinese procedure. Accordingly instructions were 
sent to the Japanese officers at Harbin to exercise 
circumspect judgment in connection with this 
matter. 
The promised written answer did not come to the 
hands of these officers up to 1 p.m. on November 
17. So they made inquiries of General Liu, Civil 
Administrator and Representative of the Heilung· 
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kiang Government. It, then, transpired that a 
telephone message had been received at his office 
from General Ma to the following effect : 
(1) That the Japanese detachment should retire 
simultaneously with the Heilungkiang army. 
(2) That activities of bandits and other circum· 
stances might necessitate the despatch of troops 
south of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the 
purpose of preserving peace and order. 
(3) That the acceptance of the Japanese proposal 
would be impossible except on condition that the 
Japanese army would not permit General Chang 
Hai-peng's troops to enter Heilungkiang Province. 
On the same afternoon Consul-General Ohashi at 
Harbin also received an answer which was no more 
reassuring as to the sincerity of General Ma than 
that addressed to the military mission already 
referred to. 
While thus dilly-dallying with the Japanese army 
on the spot, General Ma reported to General Chang 
Hsueh-liang and General Wang Pu·lin at Peiping that 
he had peremptorily rejected the Japanese proposal. 
At the same time he caused foreigners at Harbin 
to send out telegrams saying that he had accepted 
the Japanese overtures. He evidently intended to 
play up to the League of Nations Council with a 
view to turning the scale of diplomacy in favour of 
his country. 
As a matter of fact the Chinese troops on the 
spot, numerically much stronger than the Japanese, 
began to show increasing activities from about 
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November 11, assuming a provocative attitude. 
Forestalling the arrival of the relief party from the 
8th Division, the Chinese forces started offensive 
movements on November 17. The challenge was ac-
cepted by our detachment which at once began action. 
Even then the Chinese did not give up their 
game of diplomatic manoeuvring. At one o'clock 
on the afternoon of November 18, that is to say two 
days after the lapse of the time limit for reply, 
Generals Liu and Chang, speaking for General Ma, 
forwarded another reply to this effect : 
(1) That the forces concentrated in the neighbour· 
hood of Angangchi in connection with the present 
trouble would be evacuated within ten days. 
(2) That as soon as the present trouble was 
settled no troops would be sent south of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway. 
(3) That the Taonan-Angangchi line being a 
Chinese railway, it was China's responsibility to 
protect it, and that it would be operated upon the 
settlement of the present trouble, Chinese agreeing 
to the condition that she should offer no inter-
ference with its operation. 
2. Strength and Disposition of Ma's Army 
As already stated General Ma, while indulging in 
prevaricatory manoeuvres in regard to the repeated 
overtures of the Commander of the Kwantung 
Army for peace, was actually engaged in military 
preparations. He concentrated in the neighbourhood 
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of Tsitsihar the greater part of the Heilungkiang 
army and of the military guards of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway, consisting altogether of between 
20,000 and 30,000 infantry and cavalry, 30 pieces 
of artillery, over 10 pieces of trench mortars, and 
2 anti-aircraft guns. Of these, the forces concen-
trated in the neighbourhood of Angangchi comprised 
approximately 7,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 20 
pieces of artillery. They were encamped along a 
line which, starting from Tahsingtun, extended 
through Hsiaohsintun and Sanchienfang to the west 
of the last mentioned place, with the cavalry placed 
in front of the left wing. A separate position was 
prepared facing west at a place to the south-west 
of Fulaerhchi. The disposition of General Ma's 
forces on or about November 8 is shown in the 
accompanying sketch on page 19. 
It appears that General Ma completed the final 
disposition of his troops on November 11, when 
their activities became particularly noticeable. The 
following morning his cavalry was sent to the right of 
the Nonni detachment. Its vanguard now and then 
appeared in front of our line, thereby occasioning 
minor conflicts. The situation steadily became serious. 
On the night of November 13, a portion of 
General Ma's army ventured forth to Changhuayuan 
and Alihsintun, thereby threatening to envelop our 
detachment. 
The relative positions of the two opposing forces 
on November 14, were as given in the accompanying 
sketch map on page 20. 
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According. to the subsequent information brought 
in by our scouting planes, the Heilungkiang army's 
line to the east and west of Sanchienfang was 
steadily extended, its right wing reaching to a point 
some 1,000 metres south of Telimu. The different 
positions were connected by deploying trenches. 
The enemy apparently worked hard at night. His 
positions at Tahsingtun, Hsiaohsintun and Sanchien-
fang were soon surrounded with earth works with 
protected rifle holes, covered spaces, machine gun 
emplacements, and other appointments, which clear-
ly indicated that this section was his central position. 
There were altogether four lines up to Tsitsihar. 
They were as follows : 
(1) The line stretching east and west of San-
chienfang, with about 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, about 
2,000 cavalry, and about 20 pieces of artillery. 
(2) The line extending from Angangchi eastward 
to Yushutun and Taiwangsanchiatze, with about 
1,000 infantry, and about 700 cavalry. Besides, in 
the neighbourhood of Fulaerhchi there were stationed 
about 2,000 infantry, and about 1,000 cavalry, with 
2 guns. 
(3) The line extending westward to Ssuchiatze 
from Shihwulitun, 10 kilometres south of Tsitsihar. 
( 4) The line extending westward from the South 
Barracks, south of Tsitsihar. 
The last mentioned two lines were not yet actually 
manned by troops, but for that purpose there were 
kept in readiness at Tsitsihar a body of reserves 
consisting of the students of the branch military 
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academy and the school for non-commissioned 
officers, the reserve regiments and part of artillery 
corps. 
3. Activities of Japanese Army Prior 
to Engagement 
After the battle on the Nonni, the Nonni detach-
ment (whose main body consisted of 4! battalions 
under the command of Major- General Hasebe) 
remained in the vicinity of Tahsing to protect the 
repairs of the bridges. By November 10, the repair 
work had progressed barely sufficient to allow open 
cars to pass. In the meantime the planes belonging 
to the detachment were daily engaged in scouting 
over the enemy's positions, principally at Angangchi. 
They were every time exposed to the enemy's fire, 
which was particularly severe on November 9, when 
fliers were wounded by anti-aircraft guns. 
It was probably a mere coincidence, but it is 
noteworthy that on the day (November 11) when it 
was decided to despatch to Manchuria a contingent 
from the 8th Division under the command of Major-
General Suzuki to relieve the mixed Brigade from 
Chosen (Korea), General Ma's army, as already 
stated, commenced to show increased activities, 
succeeding in nearly enveloping the Nonni detach-
ment. It being increasingly evident that Ma meant 
shortly to assume the offensive, the headquarters of 
the Kwantung Army, in order to be prepared for 
emergencies, ordered the main body of the 2nd 
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Division to proceed to Tahsing on November 13, 
when the temporary repairs on the Nonni bridges 
were completed and the trial passage of a train 
was successfully carried out. 
In view of a possible offensive by the enemy, the 
Nonni detachment concentrated its main force in 
the neighbourhood of Tahsing, sending a contingent 
(two battalions of infantry and two companies of 
cavalry) to Tsienilipa to watch for developments 
and beat back the enemy's cavalry that had 
ventured to the back of our right wing. A party 
of our cavalry today was attacked by a superior 
b:>dy of the enemy's cavalry in the neighbourhood 
of Wunotouchan about 10 kilometres north-east of 
Tahsing, sustaining several casualties. A part of 
the detachment occupied, after a light engagement, 
W unotouchan and an elevated position about 1,500 
metres south of Tangti. 
The main body of the 2nd Division nearly com-
pleted its concentration at Tahsing and the neigh-
bourhood of Kiangchiao. This part of the field 
passed into the control of the commander of the 
2nd Division. The aggregate strength of our 
forces available for this district was 3,000 men, 
infantry and cavalry combined, with a little over 
20 pieces of artillery. ' 
The Japanese forces were still too small, and as 
it became evident that Ma's army intended to turn 
into the offensive before the arrival of our relief 
party on its way from the 8th Division, it was 
decided on November 17, as an emergency measure, 
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to summon a part of the air forces respectively 
belonging to the 3rd, 12th and 20th Divisions. 
4. Offensive by Japanese 
Ma's army showed a conspicuous activity on 
November 17, increasing its strength along the 
whole line, evidently with a view to starting the 
offensive movement before the arrival of our relief 
party and the newly summoned air force. There-
upon the 2nd Division decided, as a measure of 
self-preservation, upon a counter attack. The plan 
of action was to push the main attack in the 
direction of Sanchienfang and neighbourhood, and 
after breaking through the enemy's line and routing 
him, to launch the main attack in the eastern and 
north-eastern directions, thus extending the battle 
front and endeavouring to crush the enemy in the 
vicinity of his positions. The Japanese forces were 
disposed as follows: 
(l) The right wing (about 4 battalions of 
infantry) to deploy east of the railway and attack 
the enemy in the neighbourhood of Hsiaohsintun. 
(2) The left wing (about 4 battalions of infantry) 
to deploy west of the railway and attack the enemy 
in the neighbourhood of Sanchienfang. 
(3) The artillery, of which the main force to 
take up position to the north of Tangti, while a 
smaller contingent to take up position respectively 
at the back of the right and left wings. 
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( 4) The reserve to keep in readiness south of 
Tangti. 
The respective parties started motion half an 
hour after midnight on November 17, and by 3 a.m. 
they took up positions 700-800 metres in front of 
the enemy, preparatory for the attack. It was 
pitch dark and intensely cold with the thermometre 
registering 20 degrees below zero and the wind 
blowing from the north-west at the rate of 15 metres. 
About the same time the enemy's infantry began· 
to fire in the dark, and as the eastern sky began 
to grow grey at about six, more machine guns 
and rifles came into play. But the Japanese troops 
did not reply. At six-thirty, our artillery commenced 
firing to find the range, and at eight started 
bombardment which was kept up 'for about an 
hour, during which time our air forces, in co-
operation with the artillery, bombed the enemy's 
position. As our artillery range was extended, the 
first line of our infantry started the attack at about 
nine. Hand to hand fights took place at several 
points. Unable to stand our furious onslaught any 
longer, the enemy began to retire along the whble 
front at about ten-thirty, fleeing along the Taonan-
Angangchi railway on both sides of it. Thereupon 
the 2nd Division pursued the retreating enemy 
toward Tsitsihar, its main body marching along 
the railway on the western side and a portion of it 
on the eastern side. Hotly pursued, the enemy was 
unable to make a stand at his second line of 
defence iri the neighbourhood of Angangchi, retreat· 
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ing from there northward at about two in the 
afternoon. 
The officers and men of the 2nd Division were 
thoroughly tired as the result of continued and 
strenuous exertions for the past several days, and 
they suffered much from increasing cold and wind, 
which froze their food and water. But nothing 
daunted, they pursued the retreating enemy and 
arrived at a point 4 kilometres south of Tsitsihar 
half an hour after midnight on November 18. But 
our troops were in some places badly mixed up 
with the fleeing enemy, so that there was danger 
of our own men fighting each other. It was, there· 
fore, decided to concentrate the main body in the 
vicinity of Tamintun, south of Tsitsihar, where 
they had a long-needed rest. 
At noon on November 19, the main body of the 
2nd Division formed in two columns, and leaving 
the line at Tamintun and Shihwulitun, they entered 
Tsitsihar at three in the afternoon. The bulk of it 
was quartered at the South Barracks and the 
remainder at the North Barracks, leaving the duty 
of keeping order in the town to the Chinese Director 
of the Bureau of Public Safety. 
The main body of Ma's army seemed to have 
retreated in the direction of Hailun (120 kilometres 
north of Harbin and on the Hulan-Hailun railway) 
and Paichuan. By the nightfall on November 19, 
there was not visible any important body of Ma's 
troops, except small insignificant parties, within a 
radius of 30 kilometres of Tsitsihar. 
- 27 -
Our casualties consisted of 31 killed, 104 wounded 
and 13 missing, besides 300 cases of frostbite. 
The Chinese casualties must have been very 
heavy, but no reliable estimate has been forthcoming. 
It is hardly necessary to state that during this 
engagement the Japanese army took care to respect 
the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It 
also so arranged the plan of operations as to 
prevent the Chinese troops from retreating along 
the railway toward Harbin. 
In conclusion it may be stated that this engage-
ment was undertaken by the Kwantung Army 
simply as a measure of self-preservation. Conse-
quently as soon as Ma's army which menaced our 
rights and interests had been disposed of, the main 
body of our troops was withdrawn, without occupy· 
ing that part of the country. 
III. TIENTSIN INCIDENT 
After the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble, 
the sentiment among the Chinese at Tientsin grew 
steadily more and more unfriendly toward the 
Japanese. The Anti-Japanese Association's activities 
became better organized. The situation was com· 
plicated by the fact that the local Chinese, who 
had never been particularly cordial toward Chang 
Hsueh-liang, now grew hostile toward him, whose 
maladministration they held responsible for the 
Manchurian catastrophe. In order to check the 
growing popular antagonism toward him, Chang 
secretly planned to carry out a policy of drastic 
suppression against the promoters of the hostile 
movement against him. 
The anti-Chang leaders got wind of this, and 
with the object of forestalling the approaching 
danger, they set about organizing a force of plain 
clothes soldiers, which they styled The Nation 
Saving Army. On the night of November 8, men 
of this organization suddenly created trouble in the 
Chinese city of Tientsin, attacking the guardians 
of public order. 
The Commander of our garrison there made a 
public declaration of strict neutrality with regard 
to the clash between the contending Chinese factions. 
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Measures were at once taken by him for the 
maintenance of order in the Japanese settlement 
and the protection of the lives and property of the 
Japanese residents. 
But the Chinese guards stationed in the vicinity 
of the Japanese settlement fired into a position 
occupied by our troops, killing two of the latter. 
Thereupon our troops had to return the fire as a 
matter of self-defence. 
The Commander of our garrison at once .com-
municated with the Chinese authorities, and request-
ed them, with a view to avoid precipitating an 
unfortunate crisis between Japan and China, to 
order the contending Chinese factions not to 
approach within 300 metres of the Japanese settle-
ment. This request was repeated twice or three 
times, but it was not readily acted upon. As a 
matter of fact plain clothes soldiers constantly 
made their appearance, the Chinese troops also 
firing in the vicinity of the Japanese settlement. 
The Chinese authorities continued outwardly 
friendly, but there is reason to believe that th~y 
were secretly fanning the anti-Japanese feeling of 
their people. In any case the situation became so 
serious that the other foreign garrisons mounted 
guard in their respective areas from the 11th or 
12th of November. 
It transpired shortly afterward that the firing of 
the Japanese position by Chinese soldiers, which 
had been alleged to have been directed toward the 
plain clothes men belonging to the Nation Saving 
--
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Army, was really part of a deliberate scheme of 
harassing the Japanese planned by Chinese officers 
in high positions. 
On this amazing fact becoming known, the 
Chinese authorities offered a profound apology to 
the Commander of the Japanese garrison. They 
also promised to exercise a more effective control 
over the anti·Japanese propaganda, to remove all 
military works set up within 300 metres of the 
Japanese settlement, and not to permit their soldiers 
to approach within 300 metres of the settlement. 
But the dangerous practice of firing into the settle· 
ment did not cease, and the situation continued to 
be disquieting. The Japanese garrison, however, 
remained faithful to its own part of the agreement. 
It called off part of its guard, restored the traffic 
in the settlement to its normal condition, and in 
the afternoon of November 26 it disbanded the 
volunteer corps. 
At eight that evening, the Chinese suddenly 
opened a stiff firing upon our barracks from a 
position to the west of it. Our troops did not reply 
to it, but a remonstrance was at once made to the 
Chinese authorities against the extraordinary 
behaviour of their soldiers, demanding the cessa· 
tion of the firing. They alleged that the firing 
was directed against the Nation Saving Army and 
was not meant for the Japanese settlement, but 
they promised that in any case it would be stopped 
before half past ten. But the firing did not cease 
~ntil noon the following day. It was a deliberate act 
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of hostility, so that our garrison decided upon the 
only course left to it for the protection of the 
Japanese life and property in the settlement. In 
other words, it had to accept the challenge and 
fight the Chinese. 
On the morning of November 29, a representative 
of the Chinese authorities called at the headquarters 
of the Japanese garrison, and offered to withdraw 
all armed people from the neighbourhood of the 
Japanese settlement and also to remove all defence 
works set up in the Chinese city. This offer being 
accepted, the armed Chinese police were withdrawn 
by the evening of November 29, while the defence 
works were removed the following day. 
\ 
IV. CHINCHOW EPISODE 
1. Chinchow Government's Hostile 
Preparations 
After the battle of Angangchi, Ma's army seemed 
for a while bent upon an attempt to recover 
Tsitsihar. But on about December 11 there was 
concluded a compromise agreement between hiPl 
and Chang Ching-hui. In the meanwhile matters 
were steadily improving in the Province of Fengtien. 
On about December 16 General Tsang Shih-i, former 
Governor of Liaoning, accepted the post of Governor 
of Fengtien offered to him by a group of leading 
inhabitants of the province. It was evident that the 
movement for reconstruction was growing strong in 
the three north-earstern provinces with the excep-
tion of the south-western corner of Fengtien. 
In the neighbourhood of Chinchow, there was 
stationed a large force of regular troops belonging 
to Chang Hsueh-liang. Its strength was estimated 
at about 35,000 men, with a fairly strong artillery 
equipment. Its main body occupied a strong posi-
tion on the right bank of the Taling-ho (see Chart 
IV), while a detachment was stationed in the terri-
tory between that river and the Liao-ho. While in 
this way preparations were being steadily pushed 
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forward with a view to a clash with Japanese 
forces, the auxiliary troops and volunteers under 
the control of the Chingchow Government began to 
show great activities as soon as the Japanese con-
tingent that had been advancing to the west of the 
Liao-ho turned back. These irregulars tried hard · to 
cause disturbances along the South Manchuria 
Railway. 
Chang Hsueh-liang at first built high hopes upon 
the support of the League of Nations. But when he 
found that, Japan's attitude being determined, much 
could not be expected from that quarter, he made 
up his mind to fight Japan with the help and co-
operation of Nangking. With this object in "iiew, 
he concentrated to the east of Chinchow a strong 
army of regulars, 35,000 strong, made up of 3~ 
brigades of infantry, a brigade and a regiment of 
artillery. The first line occupied positions extending 
along Changwu, Paichipu, Taian and Tienchuangtai, 
with an advanced detachment in the neighbourhood 
of Fakumen. Besides, as already stated, the territory 
along the South Manchuria Railway was infested'by 
a strong body of irregulars under the control of 
Chang Hsueh-liang. It was made up of about 
30,000 auxiliaries and about 5,000 volunteers. In 
addition to these forces, bandits invited from differ-
ent parts of Manchuria were being organized into 
units. This was coincident with a general outbreak 
of bandit activities along the main line of the South 
Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden line, 
causing no small damage to Japanese subjects. 
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It is estimated by competent authorities that the 
armed forces, comprising the regulars, the irregulars 
and all other units under the direct or indirect 
control of the Chinchow Government, exceeded 
80,000. Heterogeneous as were their complexions 
and formations, .they were all united in their hostile 
attitude toward Japan. So unless Chang Hsueh-
liang was prepared to change his policy, it was 
now clear that a clash was inevitable between them 
and the Japanese army. 
2. Reinforcements from Japan 
In view of the increased activities of Chinese 
troops and bandits in Manchuria and of the serious 
situation at Tientsin, it was decided on December 
17 to despatch a specially constituted brigade, 
together with a force of heavy artillery and a party 
of rear service men to Manchuria, while a detach-
ment chiefly composed of two battalions of infantry 
was sent to Tientsin. 
By this time the organization of various irregular 
contingents by the Chinchow Government had made 
a great progress, so that disturbances of peace and 
order by these forces now became more widespread 
and serious than before. Taking advantage of the 
freezing of the Liao-ho, they crossed that river to its 
left bank in large force, and a large body of them, 
2,500 strong, took possession of the town of Nieu-
chwang on December 26, while the district to its 
north and west was in the occupation of several 
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thousand volunteers. These forces, it is needless 
to say, had penetrated so far eastward with the 
object of creating diversions in the rear of the 
Japanese detachment that was operating to the west 
of the Liao-ho. By recent experience it was well-
known that the fighting capacity of these irregulars 
was much greater than that of ordinary bandits. 
Their comrades along the Antung-Mukden line also 
showed no sign of lessened activities. 
Under these circumstances, it became evident 
that the troops available were insufficient for 
suppressing irregulars and bandits infesting the 
territory west of the Liao-ho, in addition to dealing 
with those threatening the various railway lines. 
So on December 27, at 6 p.m., Imperial sanction 
was given to the despatch of the headquarters of 
the 20th Division and its Y oda brigade to Manchuria 
to be placed under the orders of the Commander of 
the K wan tung Army. All these forces in due time 
arrived in Manchuria. ' 
3. Operations in West of Liao-ho 
The disturbances caused by the routed soldiers 
and bandits in the territory west of the Liao-ho, 
and which threatened to spread to regions nearer 
the· South Manchuria Railway lines, having become 
very serious, the main body of the Kwantung Army 
was ordered to suppress these marauding bands of 
Chinese peace breakers. The Japanese army started 
on its important expedition on December 28, the 
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Kamura Brigade proceeding along the Peiping-
Mukden Railway and the Taman division along its 
branch line. The main part of that division left 
Tienchuangtai on December 28, and proceeded along 
the route assigned to it, always taking care to 
exercise proper pressure upon such Chinese troops 
and auxiliaries as may happen to be in the neighbour-
hood. It reached Tawa at dark, and the following 
day it continued its march. At two in the after-
noon its vanguard occupied Panshan after a slight 
fighting. The Chinese force occupying that place 
was about 500 strong, made up of regular troops 
belonging to the 19th brigade (654th regiment) 
who . were in cooperation with auxiliaries. The 
division reached the neighbourhood. of Huchiawupu 
on December 30. ·-
The Kamura brigade left Hsinmintun on December 
30,. and proceeding along the main line of the 
Peiping-Mukden Railway, reached Tahushan at 
nightfall. On the way it met and dispersed some 
parties of marauders. 
On December 31, the Kamura brigade reached the 
neighbourhood of Koupangtze. As for the Tamon 
division, a part of it reached Koupangtze, while its 
main force reached a point to the south-east of that 
place on the same day. 
1 On January 1, the Kamura brigade proceeded in 
the direction of the Taling-ho and reached Shihshan-
chan at noon, while the train that carried its 
vanguard arrived at the railway bridge over the 
Taling-ho, at 3 p.m. The Tamon division was 
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occupied in concentrating its forces in the neighbour-
hood of Koupangtze. 
The; <:hinese forces that took part in the engage-
ments east of the Taling-ho comprised two regiments 
of the 19th brigade, nearly the whole of the 20th 
brigade, a portion of the 3rd cavalry brigade and 
volunteers. The casualties they sustained are 
estimated at 2,000. 
At daybreak on January 2, the Yoda brigade, 
· now forming part of the Muro division, advanced 
by the Peiping-Mukden Railway to the rear of the 
Tamon division. That night the Kamura brigade 
was quartered in villages between Shuangyangtien 
(8 kilometres east of Chinchow) and Talinghotien; 
while the Y oda brigade stayed at villages between 
Shihshanchan and Koupangtze. The K<jlmura 
brigade, which had been restored by the Com-
mander of the Kwantung Army to the Muro division, 
was charged with the task of occupying Chinchow. 
The vanguard of the above mentioned brigade 
entered Chinchow early on the morning of Janu~ry 
3, while the headquarters of the division arrived 
there at 10.40 the same afternoon. The commander 
of the division was welcomed on arrival at the rail-
way station by a large crowd of important people, 
including the heads of the various Government and 
municipal offices and leading citizens. The streets 
were lined by dense crowds of happy looking 
people, while the houses on both sides were adorned 
with Japanese flags. 
On January 4, it was as a whole quiet and peace-
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ful at Chinchow and neighbourhood, but at night a 
party of our patrols was fired upon by bandits. 
Lieutenant-General Muro ordered a detachment, 
whose main body was composed of a battalion 
commanded by a colonel, to advance west of Chin· 
chow. It proceeded this day as far as Lienshan. 
On January 5, the Muro division despatched a 
detachment each to Ichow and Suichung. A part 
of the detachment sent to the latter place continued 
its march southward on the following day to keep 
order in the region west of Suichung. Its advance 
party, on reaching Tsienso (about 20 kilometres east 
of Shanhaikwan), established a definite contact with 
the Japanese garrison at the latter place. 
A troop of cavalry belonging to the above men· 
tioned detachment was sent to Chinsi, and at about 
noon the next day it put to rout a party of about 
80 soldier bandits at a point about 10 kilometres 
west of Chinch ow. 
4. Withdrawal of Chinese Army inside 
the Great Wall 
On the night of December 29, that is to say 
before our army reached the Taling-ho line, the 
Chinese army in and round Chinchow began to 
evacuate by the Peiping·Mukden Railway. It appears 
that a part of the army withdrew in the direction 
of Jehol. As to the forces that retreated within the 
Wall, a brigade each seems to have been concen· 
trated at Lanchow, Changli and Tangshan. 
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The Chinese detachment that had stayed behind 
at Suichung commenced evacuation on the morning 
of January 5, while those stationed at Shanhaikwan 
and in the region east of it also withdrew inside 
the Wall on the night of January 5. 
This was a pitiable ending of the rather grandiose 
attempt which Chang Hsueh-liang had made for the 
recovery of Mukden. In view of the powerful pres· 
sure which self-styled patriots brought to bear upon 
him and also of the necessity of saving his face, 
Chang Hsueh-liang had no alternative but to keep 
up some show of spirit, although he may not have 
felt much confidence in the success of further 
resistance. Under the circumstances, evacuation 
without resistance was probably the wisest thing 
for him to do. There is, however, reason to believe 
that Chang Hsueh-liang's motive in ordering a 
peaceful evacuation was probably not so simple and 
harmless as it may at first sight appear. At any 
rate, the Japanese army had to face an aftermalh 
which proved anything but pleasant or easy to deal 
with. It is customary with a Chinese army wlien 
defeated, to leave behind it troops of inferior quality, 
so that they may combine with local bandits for 
the purpose of harassing the enemy's rear. At all 
events that has been exactly what happened in the 
present case. The suppression of banditry in the 
evacuated region has subsequently proved a rather 
costly affair to the Japanese army. 
The extinction of the last vestige of Chang 
Hsueh-liang's authority in Manchuria undoubtedly 
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marks an epoch in the history of that country. It 
was a definite step in the consolidation of the 
influences in favour of peace and progress in 
Manchuria. It was undoubtedly in recognition of 
this · fact that the Emperor chose this opportunity 
for honouring the Japanese army in Manchuria with 
a Message graciously acknowledging the heroic 
services which His Majesty's troops had rendered 
in different parts of Manchuria and exhorting them 
to continue their valuable exertions with a view to 
strengthening the foundation of peace in the Far 
East. 
V. HARBIN CAMPAIGN 
1. A General Outline 
The clash brought about on January 27 between 
the Kirin troops, commanded by General Hsi Hsia, 
and the anti-Kirin forces plunged the city of 
Harbin and neighbouring districts into a state of 
confusion, which was intensified by a series of 
atrocities committed by the anti-Kirin troops. 
They looted a number of Korean dwellings, attacked 
the office of a Japanese owned newspaper, the 
"Taihoku Shimpo," killed a Japanese military 
officer, and kidnapped Japanese civilians. The 
Japanese population in Harbin, numbering 5,600, 
was placed in a state of extreme danger. Tlte 
chairman of the Japanese Residents Committee 
repeatedly appealed for despatch of military troops. 
The Commander of the Kwantung Army, in view 
of the situation, was finally moved to send to 
Harbin a detachment of troops in order to guard 
peace and protect the Japanese residents. 
In the meanwhile, the anti-Kirin troops continued 
to conduct themselves with bold insolence, making 
no secret of their hostile disposition toward the 
Japanese . . Wanton deeds were committed to harm 
Japanese, ~ and malicious propaganda conducted 
against them. The second Sungali railway bridge 
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was destroyed by fire to impede the transportation 
of our troops. In the vicinity of Shuangchengpu, 
our advance forces encountered armed resistance. 
Under the circumstances, our military forces were 
obliged to take action against them. The enemy 
forces holding positions to the south of Harbin 
were consequently routed. Our troops entered the 
city of Harbin on February 5. 
2. Northern Campaign of the Kirin Army 
The downfall of Chang Hsueh-liang after the 
outbreak of the Manchurian trouble ushered in a 
new era of hope for the thirty million people in 
that country. The situation has since been fast 
maturing for the birth of a new state where justice 
and righteousness should hold domain. In the 
province of Kirin a new government was set up 
with Hsi Hsia at its head, with the object of 
replacing the old corrupt system by a new and 
better one. The populace has hailed the new 
regime with enthusiasm, even many of the men 
who had served under the former military power 
having sworn allegiance. The only case of defection 
was a group of military men who were formerly 
under the command of General Chang Tso-hsiang, 
head of the Kirin government under the old regime. 
These men, still receiving directions from Chang 
Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang in Peiping, set 
up a provincial government at Pinhsien, a point 
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northeast of Harbin, and refused to take orders 
from the new administration at Kirin. Repeated 
invitations having failed to win the allegiance of 
these men, the Kirin government was at length 
compelled to use force. 
The military forces of the Kirin government, 
starting their operations on January 5, directed 
their way northward, meeting with but weak 
resistances. Having routed the enemy forces along 
the route, they took possession of Yushu on January 
18. Thence they set their eyes in the direction of 
Harbin, the centre of political and economic 
activities as well as communication in North 
Manchuria. 
Alarmed over the situation thus precipitated, the 
anti-Kirin men in Harbin met in council. With 
the exception of the chairman, Cheng Yun, 
practically all leaders, such as Li Chen-sheng, Fertg 
Chan-hai, Li Tu, Su Te-ehan and others, in consul· 
tation with Chin Hsuan-wu, representing Hsi Hsia, 
adopted a resolution to the effect 
(1) That their military forces would surrender 
themselves to Hsi Hsia, who should provide them 
with military expenses, and 
(2) That the Pinhsien government would be 
abolished. 
General Chang Tso-hsiang in Peiping, hearing of 
this, sent to Cheng Yun and Chang Tso-chou on 
January 20 instructions to the effect that the 
military troops, under the circumstances, should 
place themSQlves under the command of General 
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Chang Ching-hui, Governor of the Heilungkiang 
Province, while the Pinhsien government should 
declare itself subject to the Command of the 
Harbin Special Area, a post which General Chang 
Ching-hui also held. It was plain beyond question 
that Chang Tso-hsiang's intention, in issuing such 
instructions, was to preserve his former troops in 
the name of the Heilungkiang governor. All efforts 
at peaceful settlement having failed, Hsi Hsia 
decided to settle the matter by armed argument. 
His troops were again put in motion on January 
21, one part advancing on Harbin through Shuang-
chengpu and the other by way of Acheng. 
3. Conditions in Harbin 
The Kirin troops at first found little to impede 
their progress northward. They ousted the troops 
under Feng Chan-hai, occupying Lalin, and reached 
the vicinity of Acheng two days later. Having 
arrived in the outlying district south of Harbin on 
January 25, a portion of their forces was set to 
clearing the regions about Acheng and south of 
Shuangchengpu, their plan being to enter the city 
of Harbin the next day. 
However, in anticipation of the disturbances that 
might be caused within the city by military opera-
tions, the Kirin troops sent to demand General 
Ting Chao, in command of the anti-Kirin forces, 
to remove his troops out of town toward Pinhsien, 
with which the latter refused to comply. On the 
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contrary, General Li Tu, Commander of the 24th 
brigade stationed at Ilan, a point 60 kilometres 
northeast of Harbin, suddenly entered China Town 
(Puchiatien) of Harbin in the morning of January 
26, at the head of two of his battalions. Falling 
in with the soldiers under Ting Chao and Hsing 
Chan-ching, they were soon in control of the 
Chinese quarters and lost no time in plundering, 
causing a panic throughout the city. The resident 
Japanese population, of which 4,000 were Japanese 
proper and 1,600 Koreans, were at once exposed to 
serious danger. The Japanese residents quickly 
rose to the situation organizing volunteer forces to 
protect the Japanese colony, and aiding their 
nationals to flee from China Town. One Japanese 
and three Koreans were killed in flight by soldiers 
belonging to Ting Chao's army. Several Korean 
females were kidnapped. · 
The Kirin troops, who had been withholding 
themselves, could no longer stay behind, almost in 
sight of such disturbances in Harbin. They 
resumed their march to save the city from 
confusion, only to come into conflict south of China 
Town with the soldiers under Ting Chao, Li Tu 
and Chang Tso-chou. It was then that a Japanese 
scouting aeroplane which had been despatched to 
survey the conditions in and about Harbin, 
particularly with regard to the Japanese residents 
there, was compelled by some mechanical trouble 
to alight on a farm to the south of Harbin. 
Captain Shimizu, of artillery, who was aboard the 
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machine, was killed by cavalry men belonging to 
Ting Chao's army. 
Whereupon our official representatives in Harbin 
took up the matter with General Ma Chan-shan 
who had arrived at the same city on January 27 
in order to offer his service for mediating between 
the Kirin and Chang Ching-hui army on the one 
hand and the anti-Kirin troops on the other. The 
murder of our scouting officer and residents was 
reported to General Ma, as cases chargeable 
against soldiers under Ting Chao and Chang Tso· 
chou, demanding his serious attention. In the 
night of the same day, however, the "Taihoku 
Shimpo," a Japanese owned newspaper, was attacked 
and looted by Chinese soldiers. Disturbances 
became worse in the Chinese quarters. On January 
28 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other 
Chinese associations jointly petitioned for despatch 
of Japanese troops. 
The Japanese residents in Harbin, on instruction 
from their Consul General, began on January 28 to 
gather at prescribed points in the town, and 
organized volunteer forces for self-protection. The 
Koreans in Puchiatien, numbering more than 1,500, 
were brought under protection in the primary 
school premises near the River Front. 
4. Northern Movement of the Kwantung Army 
The K wan tung Army, being well aware of the 
lawless character of Chinese soldiers turning into 
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marauders after a defeat on the field of battle, 
decided to despatch for the protection of the 
Japanese residents a detachment formed of two 
infantry battalions under Major-General Hasebe. 
The first difficulty then experienced was railway 
traffic. The employees of the southern branch of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway had practically all of 
them deserted their posts. What was more, the Kirin 
authorities had a number of carriages under deten-
tion with the object of transporting its own railway 
guard forces to Harbin. Undue delay was caused 
through these and other circumstances, so that it 
was not before the night of January 28 that by 
recourse to temporary measures three trains were 
at length formed and sent northward. Their pro-
gress was next impeded by a portion of the Chinese 
22nd brigade, stationed along the southern branch 
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which, in an attempt 
to interfere with our military expedition, destroyed 
the second bridge across the Sungali River on 
January 28, causing further delay in transit. Tem-
porary repairs being made the next day, the military 
trains forced their way across the river. 
The Kirin army, on the other hand, in considera-
tion of the damage to be caused to the civil popula-
tion in Harbin by bombardment, retreated some 
distance from the city, suspending its fire for the 
time being. The anti-Kirin forces, however, contin-
ued to increase their ranks by the enrollment of 
bandits. Their troops were being steadily concen-
trated about Harbin, stationing the main force on a 
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line running from the southwestern end of the city 
to Old Harbin, while another portion took its posi· 
tion on the east side of Harbin. They openly 
declared themselves in readiness to meet the Japa· 
nese in armed conflict. From their manifest temper 
and bold movement it was concluded that fighting 
was in sight and unavoidable. The Commander of 
the Kwantung Army issued an order on January 29 
to Lieutenant-General Tamon, Commander of the 
2nd Division, to advance his main force to Harbin 
and protect the Japanese residents there. 
The detachment under Major-General Hasebe, 
overcoming a series of troubles on the railway, 
pushed its march northward, until it arrived about 
5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 30 at Shuang· 
chengpu where it passed the night. Early in the 
following morning toward daybreak an enemy force 
(the main body of the 22nd brigade), some 2,000 of 
infantry and several pieces of artillery, raided our 
camp under cover of darkness. They advanced at 
a time within a distance of only 20 metres from 
our position, but were finally repulsed, after a sharp 
engagement, about 10.30 o'clock in the morning, 
with heavy damage, one of their units being almost 
completely annihilated. Our casualties were 13 dead 
and 35 wounded. 
In view of the character of resistance to be 
expected, the Commander of the Kwantung Army 
ordered the troops in Tsitsihar to reinforce the 
troops near Harbin. 
In the evening of January 31 the Kwantung Army 
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addressed an ultimatum to Ting Chao, Li Tu, Li 
Chen-sheng and other leaders of the anti-Kirin army, 
accusing them of their aggressive operations of the 
same morning, and demanding them to resign their 
positions in token of their allegiance. It was also 
notified that, in the event of their failure to comply 
therewith, the Kwantung Army would take action 
against the whole anti-Kirin army as its enemy. 
The anti-Kirin leaders were informed at the same 
time that inasmuch as the Soviet authorities had 
given their agreement to offer no interference with 
military transportation on the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way, the Japanese would not infringe upon the 
rights of the same railway, and hoped that the 
anti-Kirin army would likewise guard themselves 
against any step likely to cause complication in the 
same respect. 
As for the management of the Chinese Eastern , 
Railway which at first showed an unfavourable 
attitude as to the transportation of the Hasebe. 
detachment, they were informed that " our army 
being forwarded for the sole purpose of protecting 
our nationals in Harbin, they should offer no inter-
ference with our military transportation." To this 
the Soviet representatives gave formal agreement on 
January 30. Nevertheless, the railway still continued 
to be destroyed between Harbin and Shuangchengpu 
and also in the rear of the Hasebe detachment, 
considerably impeding the northern progress of our 
troops The 2nd Division, under the circumstances, 
managed to do the best it could with a limited 
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quantity of rolling stock at its disposal, while it 
began on February 1 to transport soldiers in motor 
cars that had been concentrated at Changchun. 
Continuing its progress under such unfavourable 
conditions, the main force succeeded in concentrating 
near Shuangchengpu in the morning of February 3. 
With regard to the expedition of military troops 
to Harbin, the K wan tung Army issued on February 
1 the following notice : 
" The Japanese army has been despatched to 
Harbin for the sole purpose of protecting our 
nationals and maintaining the public peace in the 
same city. Not only common civilians but even 
men of military affiliations will be left free if they 
refrain from any hostile action against our army. 
The general populace are advised to feel themselves 
secure and follow their peaceful pursuits. As for 
the Chinese Eastern Railway and all other institu-
tions owned by a third nation, the Japanese army 
shall offer no interference, taking a strictly neutral 
attitude. Although the Japanese army will remain 
true to its aforesaid policy of justice and fairness, 
it will promtly deal with any act of hostility or any 
attempt to interfere with its work. Civil as well 
as military people are hereby advised to repose 
confidence in the Japanese army and properly shape 
their conduct in accordance therewith. " 
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5. Anti·Kirin Army in Harbin Well 
Prepared 
The anti-Kirin army stationed in and about Harbin, 
which had assumed for itself the name of the 
" Self-Protection Army " under the leadership of 
General Li Tu, commander of the 24th brigade, 
issued on January 31 a notice which may be 
regarded as a sort of ultimatum running in sub· 
stance as follows : 
" Whereas the Japanese acts of aiding and abetting 
internal troubles, and their seizing of railway trains, 
even killing and wounding railway employees, show 
the course they are bent on following with forcible 
means, defying the dignity of our nation, we have 
decided to mobilize all available troops for the 
purpose of a combined armed resistance. Our end 
being clear, we hold ourselves above thoughts of 
success or failure. We hereby announce the forma· 
tion of the Self-Protection Army, praying for the 
support of all our brethren-,. 
In the meantime Chang Hsueh-liang had ordered 
Ting Chao and Ma Chan-shan to hold Harbin in their 
hands, while he strove to strengthen his own posi· 
tion by enlisting the support of Soviet Russia 
through Mo Te-hui who was in Moscow in charge 
of Sino-Soviet negotiations. On the other hand, the 
Pinhsien government which had been formed by a 
handful of men, finding its geographical position 
unsuitable for administrative purposes, set up in 
Harbin what they called the Kirin Committee of 
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Peace. Ting Chi as chairman was put in charge 
of military, administrative and financial affairs, to 
the end of attaining under one head an internal 
solidarity against our army. Ting Chi, anticipating 
the eastward advance of our troops from Tsitsihar, 
ordered the guards of the western section of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway to destroy the railway. 
Consequently, the railway and other means of 
communication were cut off between Harbin and 
Tsitsihar on the night of February 2. 
In the rear of our line, the railway guard force 
(1 company of the Independent Railway Guards) at 
Lalinchia, a point about 25 kilometres south of 
Shuangchengpu, was assaulted on February 1 by a 
Chinese force of 1,000 men. The next day our 
company of railway guards at Changchiawan, about 
· 70 kilometres north of Changchun, was attacked bY. 
Chinese soldiers numbering about 400. The assail-
ants were repulsed in each case with heavy 
damage. 
On or about February 3, the anti-Kirin army 
about Harbin, which had steadily been adding to 
its ranks, had swelled to a force of some 13,000 to 
14,000 soldiers, who were disposed as shown in 
the sketch on page 53. 
The Right Area (about Kuhsiangtun) : about 1,000 
men ; 6 pieces of field artillery. 
The Central Area (between Intendantskaya and 
Hospital Street): about 3,000 men-; 2 pieces of 
artillery; light wire entanglements before the line, 
and dwelling houses provided with defensive work. 
53 
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The Left Area (about Old Harbin) : some 7,000 
men ; 4 pieces of artillery. 
The Cavalry Force : Several hundred of cavalry 
men under the command of Feng Chan-hai. 
The above, altogether about 11,000 in number, 
formed the first line. 
The Reserves: Reserve forces numbering 2,000 
to 3,000 were stationed at Machiakou on the east 
of Harbin and near Old Harbin. 
6. Entry of the 2nd Division into 
Harbin 
The 2nd Division, which had concentrated its 
main force near Shuangchengpu in the morning of 
February 3, lost no time to advance northward. 
Pressing upon inferior enemy forces along the way, 
our soldiers arrived in the evening on the line of 
the Weitangkou-ho, some 50 kilometres north 
of Shuangchengpu, where they passed the night. 
Resuming the march northwatd the following 
morning, the Division came upon the enemy line 
about 11 a.m. At 3.30 p.m. our objective was set 
on Paicliiawupeng and Hospital Street, forming the 
centre of the enemy line. A part of our forces then 
started operations against the enemy's right wing, 
advancing within 400 to 500 metres from their 
position, where they passed the night. On the same 
night another part of the Division, making a night 
raid, occupied a sector of the enemy line near the 
monument standing in honour of two Japanese 
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heroes in the war with Russia, near the southeast 
end of Hospital Street. 
The 2nd Division resumed the offensive in the 
morning of February 5. When the enemy line 
began to show signs of wavering at about 10 a.m., 
our troops intensified their action until they took 
possession of the enemy's position around noon. 
Toward 3 p.m. the enemy forces, completely routed, 
were ~eeing from Harbin towards Pinhsien and 
elsewhere. 
The city of Harbin had been restored to peace. 
The Japanese residents had been freed from the 
grip of terror. They, with Russian and even Chinese 
population, came forth to receive the entry of our 
army into Harbin with heartiest ovations. 
In this connection it is important to note that our 
military forces, in conducting their operations in 
this campaign, took every precaution to prevent 
disturbances to foreign residents, and directed with 
scrupulous care their rifle and artillery fire and 
every other offensive action, so as to avoid the 
railway and other public institutions in the city. 
The Self-Protection Army, having abandoned 
Harbin, moved its main force in the direction of 
Pinhsien. A section of their troops have since gone 
as far as Hulan, north of Harbin, while the other 
toward Acheng, south of Harbin. An independent 
detachment (affiliated bandit soldiers) under Kuan 
Chung-hai directed its course to Acheng. Ting Chao 
and Li Tu are thought to have fallen back to Hulan, 
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and Feng Chan·hai to Pinhsien, where they /are no II 
doubt collecting their routed ranks. 
Through the military operations near Harbin 
lasting 5 days from February 4, our casualties were 
31 killed and 65 wounded. While the enemy's 
casualties are not definitely known, they have 
beyond doubt suffered considerably heavier damage. 
The progress of military operations in this 
campaign is shown in the sketch on page 56. 
7. Conclusion 
The trouble in Harbin, which called for the above 
military action, was occasioned by internal disagree· 
ment within the Chinese military camp, with its 
centre at Harbin. The trouble sprang up just when 
Manchuria, with the support of her military and 
other influential elements, was paving the way for 
the creation of a new independent state comprising 
Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and a part of 
Mongolia whence the old regime had been driven 
off. The disturbances caused in this way threatened 
the lives and property of not only our own people 
but many other resident nationals there ; but they 
were put an end to by the prompt and timely 
action of our army. In a way, the above campaign 
has served to clear North Manchuria of what had 
still remained of the old military power, thus 
removing an obstacle that had stood in the way of 
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bringing the new state into being, materially 
clearing the atmosphere for the outlook for future. 
We are pleased to add in conclusion that Soviet 
Russia and her representatives on the management 
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, properly appreciat-
ing the rightful policy of Japan, adopted a fair-
minded attitude toward our military operations in 
and round Harbin. 
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